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Foreword
In a spring 1999 poll of opinion leaders sponsored by leading news organizations in
the United States, the 100 most significant events of the 20 _ century were ranked.
The Moon landing was a very close second to the splitting of the atom and its use
during World War II. "It was agonizing," CNN anchor and senior correspondent Judy
Woodruff said of the selection process. Probably, historian Arthur M. Schlesinger,
Jr., best summarized the position of a large number of individuals polled. "The one
thing for which this century will be remembered 500 years from now was: This was
the century when we began the exploration of space." He noted that Project Apollo
gave many a sense of infmite potential. "People always say: If we could land on the
Moon, we can do anything," said Maria Elena Salinas, co-anchor at Miami-based
Spanish-language cable network Univision, who also made it her first choice.
With his 81-year-old eyes, historian Schlesinger
looked forward toward a positive future and
that prompted him to rank the lunar landing
first. "I put DNA and penicillin and the comput-
er and the microchip in the first 10 because
they've transformed civilization. Wars vanish,"
Schlesinger said, and many people today can-
not even recall when the Civil War took place.
"Pearl Harbor will be as remote as the War of
the Roses," he said, referring to the English
civil war of the 15th century. And there's no
need to get hung up on the ranking, he added.
"The order is essentially very artificial and ficti-
tious," he said. "It's very hard to decide the
atomic bomb is more important than getting on
the Moon."
There have been many detailed historical stud-
ies of the process of deciding on and executing
the Apollo lunar landing during the 1960s and
early 1970s. From the announcement of
President John F. Kennedy on May 25, 1961, of
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his decision to land an American on the Moon
by the end of the decade, through the first lunar
landing on July 20, 1969, on to the last of six
successful Moon landings with Apollo 17 in
December 1972, NASA carried out Project
Apollo with enthusiasm and aplomb.
Of all the difficulties facing NASA in its bid to
send humans to the Moon in the Apollo program,
management was perhaps the greatest challenge.
James Webb, NASA administrator from 1961 to
1968, often stated that while the technological
aspects of reaching the Moon were daunting,
these challenges were all within grasp. More dif-
ficult was ensuring that those technical skills
were properly utilized and managed. Thus, the
success or failure of Apollo in large part depend-
ed on the quality of its management. "We can lick
gravity, but sometimes the paperwork is over-
whelming," Wemher von Braun once said.
To a very real extent, Project Apollo was a tri-
umph of management in meeting enormously
difficult systems engineering and technological
integration requirements. NASA leaders had to
acquire and organize unprecedented resources
to accomplish the task at hand. From both a
political and technological perspective, man-
agement was critical. The technological accom-
plishments of Apollo were indeed spectacular.
However, it may be that the most lasting legacy
of Apollo was human: an improved understand-
ing of how to plan, coordinate, and monitor the
myriad technical activities that were the build-
ing blocks of Apollo.
More to the point, NASA personnel employed a
"program management" concept that central-
ized authority over design, engineering, pro-
curement, testing, construction, manufactur-
ing, spare parts, logistics, training, and opera-
tions. The management of the program was
recognized as critical to Apollo's success in
November 1968, when Science magazine, the
publication of the American Association for the
Advancement of Science, observed:
In terms of numbers of dollars or of
men, NASA has not been our largest
national undertaking, but in terms of
complexity, rate of growth, and tech-
nological sophistication it has been
unique....It may turn out that [the space
program's] most valuable spin-off of all
will be human rather than technologi-
cal: better knowledge of how to plan,
coordinate, and monitor the multitudi-
nous and varied activities of the organ-
izations required to accomplish great
social undertakings.
The editor of Science probably did not fully
understand the complex project management
procedures used on Project Apollo.
While there have been many studies recounting
the history of Apollo, at the time of the 30_
anniversary of the first lunar landing by Apollo
11, it seems appropriate to revisit the process of
large-scale technological management as it relat-
ed to the lunar mission. Consequently, the NASA
History Office has chosen to publish this mono-
graph containing the recollections of key partici-
pants in the management process. The collective
oral history presented here was recorded in 1989
at the Johnson Space Center's Gilruth Recreation
Center in Houston, Texas. It includes the recol-
lectious of key participants in Apollo's adminis-
tration, addressing issues such as communica-
tion between field centers, the prioritization of
technological goals, and the delegation of
responsibility. The following people participated:
Howard W. (Bill) Tin-
dall Jr. was responsi-
ble for planning all 10
Gemini missions. He
was an expert in orbital
mechanics and a key
figure in the develop-
ment of rendezvous
techniques for Gemini
and lunar trajectory techniques for Apollo. He
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wasalsotheinventorof"Tindallgrams,"memos
thatcapturedthedetailsof Apollooperations
planning.HeretiredfromNASAin 1979.
SpaceShuttle.Heleft
George E. Mueller was
NAS_:s associate admin-
istrator for manned space
flight fxom 1963 to 1969.
As such, he was responsi-
ble for overseeing the
completion of Project
Apollo and beginning
the development of the
NASA in 1969.
Owen W. Morris worked
at the Langley Research
Center from 1948 until
the Space Task Group
moved to Houston, Texas,
in 1962. He worked for
NASA during Apollo's
entirety. Morris was chief
engineer of the lunar
module, manager of the lunar module, and later
the manager of the Apollo program office.
Maxime A. Faget joined
the Space Task Group in
NASA in 1958. He be-
came NASA Manned
Spacecraft Center's (des-
ignated the Johnson
Space Center in 1973)
assistant director for
engineering and devel-
opment in 1962 and later its director. Faget con-
tributed many of the original design concepts
for Project Mercury's spacecraft and played a
major role in designing virtually every U.S.
crewed spacecraft since then, including the
Space Shuttle.
Robert R. Gilruth served as assistant director at
Langley from 1952 to 1959 and as assistant direc-
tor (manned satellites) and head of Project
Mercury from 1959 to
1961. In early 1961 an inde-
pendent Space Task
Group was established
under Gilruth at Langley to
supervise the Mercury pro-
gram. This group moved to
the Manned Spacecraft
Center, Houston, Texas, in
1962. Gilruth was then director of the Houston
operation from 1962 to 1972.
Christopher C. Kraft Jr.
was a long-standing offi-
cial with NASA through-
out the Apollo pro-
gram. In 1958, while at
the Langley Research
Center, he became a
member of the Space
Task Group developing
Project Mercury, and he later moved with the
Group to Houston in 1962. He was flight direc-
tor for all of the Mercury and many of the
Gemini missions and directed the design of
Mission Control at the Manned Spacecraft
Center (MSC), later designated Johnson Space
Center. He was named the MSC deputy director
in 1970 and director two years later, a position
he held until his retirement in 1982.
The valuable perspectives of these individuals
deepen and expand our understanding of this
important historical event.
This gathering was organized through the efforts
of the Lyndon Baines Johnson Space Center in
Houston, Texas, at the time of the 20 _ anniver-
sary of the Apollo 11 landing. In particular,
Joseph P. Loftus, Jr., played a central role in
bringing these key Apollo managers together.
This is the 14_ in a series of special studies pre-
pared by the NASA History Office. The
Monographs in Aerospace History series is
designed to provide a wide variety of investiga-
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tionsrelativeto thehistoryof aeronauticsand
space.Thesepublicationsare intendedto be
tightly focusedin termsof subject,relatively
shortin length,andreproducedinaninexpen-
siveformatto allowtimelyandbroaddissemi-
nationto researchersin aerospacehistory.
Suggestionsfor additionalpublicationsin the
Monographs in Aerospace History series are
welcome.
Roger D. Launius
Chief Historian
National Aeronautics and
Space Administration
April 18, 1999
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Prefaceand
Acknowledgments
The idea for getting on the record the recollections of those who had been intimate-
ly involved in the management of Project Apollo came from Joseph P. Loftus, Jr., of
the Johnson Space Center. Mr. Loftus, who had himself been involved in the Apollo
project, has long been an advocate of the value of recording the history of space
exploration. He, with other Johnson personnel, organized this set of recollections
with key personnel from the Apollo management team. The purpose was to exact
lessons learned in management practices. I was honored to be asked by Mr. Loftus
to moderate this fascinating discussion.
These reminiscences took the form of a work-
shop that was recorded on videotape at the
Gilruth Recreation Center at the Johnson
Space Center, on July 21, 1989. This document
and the videotape of the workshop itseff were
made available to various archives and
research centers concerned with space and
with the major events at that time.
The workshop would not have been possible
without the financial support of the Lyndon
Baines Johnson Space Center. The ability of the
Space Policy Institute to undertake worthwhile
projects such as this is a result of the generosity
of the several corporate contributors to the
Institute's work.
Of course, all of us involved in organizing this
workshop owe great thanks to the participants,
both for sharing their experiences with us and
for the contributions they have made to their
country, both during Project Apollo and
throughout their careers.
John M. Logsdon
Director
Space Policy Institute
George Washington University
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Roundtable
Discussion
DR. LOGSDON:
My name is John Logsdon. I am the director of
the Space Policy Institute at George
Washington University in Washington, D.C. and
I have a unique opportunity this afternoon to
moderate a discussion among the people that
made the Apollo program happen.
Our goal this afternoon is to get down on video
tape for both the current and future genera-
tions involved in the space program some sense
of the working of the Apollo program: how it
was managed, how the presidential goal of
landing man safely on the Moon and returning
him to Earth before the decade is out was
turned into an operating program-engineering,
development, and operations.
At my left are six of the people most totally
involved in the Apollo program. And to get
started, I am going to ask each one of them to
identify themselves, how they came to the pro-
gram, and the roles they played in it.
MR. TINDALL:
My name is Bill Tindall. I started with NACA
way back in 1948. I got involved at Langley
Research Center with Project Echo, and then
Mercury, Gemini, and Apollo. I worked for
Chris Kraft, who you will meet when we final-
ly get around to the other end. I was a deputy
division chief in his Flight Operations
Directorate, but the division chief didn't really
need a deputy, so most of the time Chris just
loaned me out to other places. I worked for
Joe Shea for a while on the Apollo on-board
software, for the spacecraft software, and
then for George Low doing mission tech-
niques, which is basically trying to figure out
how we were going to fly the mission.
DR. MUELLER:
I am George Mueller. I am president of the
International Academy of Astronautics. I was
associate administrator for Manned Spaceflight
during the Apollo and the Gemini programs.
And my role was, I guess, trying to make every-
thing happen at once and only a little faster
than people thought was possible. And over
time, we managed to do what people thought
was impossible. And that was a very worth-
while thing to accomplish.
MR. MORRIS:
I am Owen Morris. Like Bill, 1 joined the
Langley Research Center in 1948, was in super-
sonic aerodynamic research until the time the
Space Task Group moved to Houston. I worked
in the Apollo program office all the way
through Apollo. I was primarily chief engineer
of the lunar module, manager of the lunar mod-
ule, and then later in the program, manager of
the Apollo program office.
DR. FAGET:
I am Max Faget. I also started at the Langley
Research Center in 1946 working for Bob
Gilruth. The Mercury program was started
there under the Space Task Group, again under
Dr. Gilruth. And I came over here to Houston
with the Space Task Group to do the lunar mis-
sion and I was the head of engineering here at
Johnson Space Center.
DR. GILRUTH:
My name is Bob Gilruth. I have worked for the
U.S. Government ever since I graduated from
college as an aeronautical engineer. I started
out with airplanes, went through the develop-
ments of World War II, and then when space
came along, I was in the right place to work on
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the public to the flights that we had made.
i _,_ _!_'" "
And he wanted to do something even much greater tha  at. 
L Z
flying men in space. We started with orbiting
people, and then finally we got to going to the
Moon. We flew six missions to the Moon. We
brought everybody back, and then shortly after
that I did other work and I was no longer in
charge. But many of these people here kept it
going.
DR. KRAFT:
My name is Chris Kraft. I started at age 20 at the
NACA. I came there from college, I suppose, in
1945. I worked for Bob Gilruth in Flight
Operations testing airplanes, learning what fly-
ing qualities were that Bob Gilruth had invent-
ed. From that point on, I did a lot of things that
I had a lot of tim with until the space program
started. Bob Gilruth asked me to join the Space
Task Group in September of 1958. From that
time on, I was involved with Flight Operations
in all of the manned space flight programs. For
Apollo, I was the director of Flight Operations
and fortunate enough to be intimately involved
in the planning of that great and fantastic voy-
age. And then from '72 to '82, I was the director
of the Johnson Space Center.
DR. LOGSDON:
Clearly a distinguished panel. Gentlemen, what
I am going to do is direct a question at one or
the other of you as we go along, but I think all
of you should feel free to chime in. And since
we have so much to cover in a couple of hours,
let's try to keep our answers not to the normal
garrulous length of telling stories, but really
down to the point.
I am going to start with Dr. Gilmth. When John
Kennedy went before Congress on May 25,
1961, and said we were going to the Moon, our
total flight experience was one 15-minute sub-
orbital flight. You have been widely quoted as
being aghast at the notion that the United States
was committing itself to send people to the
Moon, at least on a specific schedule. Talk a lit-
de bit about the kind of challenges that you all
of a sudden had responsibility for carrying out.
DR. GILRUTH:
Well, let me tell you this i'h-St. The president
talked to me before he made his statement. I
told him that I thought that maybe we could go
to the Moon, but I wasn't sure that we could.
And there were a lot of unknowns that we
would have to uncover before we were sure.
And he said well, let's go ahead and say we can
do it in a decade. And we will do the best we
can, and if all things work, why we will do what
we want to do.
He was very impressed with the reaction of the
public to the flights that we had made. And he
wanted to do something even much greater
than that. Of course, he was a young man. He
was much younger than I was at that time. But
he was very bright, and he was an easy, good
man to work for because he really wanted us to
be successful. So that's really how it all got
started.
DR. LOGSDON:
Max, I know you had been working with groups
in Headquarters and involved in some commit-
tees, even before the Kennedy announcement,
thinking about the lunar landing as the appro-
priate post-Mercury goal. What was the kind of
engineering outlook at that point? Did we know
how to do the job?
DR. FAGET:
We knew what had to be done. How to do it in
10 years was never addressed before the
announcement was made. But quite simply, we
considered a program of a number of phases.
The first phase was simply to fly out to the
Moon, make a circumlunar flight, as we put it,
never going into orbit but passing nearby and
then whipping on back to the Earth, which was
pretty easy on the total propulsion require-
ments, and was fairly safe from the standpoint
of guidance. If you missed the Moon by a large
enough margin, you were fairly certain to come
back in at an acceptable entry angle.
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Afterdoingthat,we finallylearneda little bit
moreaboutwhatdeepspaceflightmightbe
like.Wethoughtthenextphasewouldbe to
orbittheMoon,andwewoulddothatwiththe
senseofafollow-onprogram,thattheyevolved
from the first oneandthat finallywewould
evolveto whenwewouldaccomplisht eland-
ingfromalunar-orbiting,know-howbase.
DR. LOGSDON:
But all of that got very compressed very quickly.
DR. FAGET:
It all got compressed into one big program. But
actually, in concept, we continued to maintain
the idea that we would orbit the Moon before
we landed, and we would want to do some
reconnaissance from orbit before we landed.
Fortunately, there was enough money to buy a
lunar orbiter, which was an unmanned space-
craft which provided some excellent photo-
graphs of the Moon from which a lot of mis-
sions could be planned.
DR. LOGSDON:
All of a sudden, instead of being a group of
people that all knew one another located in
Hampton, Virginia, you were sitting on top of a
national priority, with not exactly a blank
check, but with certainly a lot of resources
available to you, a set of dates to meet, and
instead of doing the work yourself, managing a
lot of contracts. I think Bill or Owen may be
the right persons to start on this, but I think it
goes to all of you. How did you change the
character of the work you were doing in order
to take on a task of this size? What were the
early steps? Owen?
MR. MORRIS:
Well, it was a big change, I think, for just about
everybody involved in the program at that time.
First, we had to work with Max and his people
to understand in a little bit more detail what the
systems would be. And we spent almost two
years, as a matter of fact, before the final mode
to reach the Moon was selected. And the space-
craft components could then be defined in
some detail. In the meantime, we knew enough
to start the Command and Service Module
since it ultimately, essentially, had to go to the
Moon, take care of the people on the way there
and the way back, and reenter the Earth's
atmosphere. We were not intimately involved
with the rest of the operation.
Once we had defmed the mission and worked
with Chris and Bill and their people to under-
stand a little bit more about the operations, we
were able to organize the system a little bit bet-
ter. I think the biggest challenges that we had,
or at least that I, from where I saw the program,
was one of communication and coordination. I
certainly had been used to working on the
smaller jobs, smaller programs, where you inti-
mately knew almost all of the people involved
and were able to, by personal relations, do
most of the management things you needed to
do. All of a sudden, we were thrust into a great
big program with tens of thousands of people
involved. And trying to get communication and
organization set up so that everybody under-
stood how the program worked was probably
the biggest challenge.
DR. LOGSDON:
Bill, do you have anything to add to that?
MR. TINDALL:
Well, yes. I think the other thing that you have
to remember is that when we really started the
space program, it was before Apollo. And we
were working on Mercury, and I worked on
Echo. It was at that time where people like
me, mechanical engineers who didn't know
anything about that sort of thing, suddenly
found out what orbital mechanics were, how
computers worked, how to program them, and
things like that. So that it wasn't just a jump
right into Apollo, but we really had some pret-
ty nice stepping stones to kind of learn our
way along.
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DR.KRAFT:
I think that is a good point. I think that you have
to recognize that those of us who came from
NACA weren't totally blind to the industry. All
of us that worked in NACA were used to work-
ing with the aircraft manufacturers, particular-
ly we in Flight Operations, Max in missiles, and
Bill in instrumentation, and so forth. So it was
not a dumb thing to us. And as Bill points out, I
think that in the beginning of the Mercury pro-
gram, where we had guys like Zimmerman to
help us with formulating contracts and getting
those contracts set up, etc., we weren't totally
ignorant to how to do that job.
I think the other aspect of Apollo was that it
gave all of us young guys, like Max and myself,
under the tutelage of Bob Gilruth, the new
opportunity to go out and become managers of
this sort. It was a great challenge to us, and we
looked at it that way. And it became a heck of a
great game for us.
DR. LOGSDON:
So it really started with Mercury.
DR. KRAFT:
Absolutely.
MR. TINDALL:
Even before that.
DR. LOGSDON:
Where you had a set of experiences that you
could apply to a much more sizable problem.
DR. KRAFT:
Yes. And I think we learned a great deal about
how to approach the spacecraft operations and
manufacturing job from Mercury. The industry
grew just as we did. So we both grew up togeth-
er.
DR. GILRUTH:
You must remember that we started Mercury
before there was any thought of going to the
Moon. And we flew Mercury before that. And it
was Gemini, the second spacecraft, well in
hand when we realized that we were going to
have to go to the Moon. We used Gemini as a
way of finding out whether we could do ren-
dezvous and all those other things. So we were
kind of lucky that we got started the way we
did.
DR. KRAFT:
Very fortunate. I think that the question is did
we have to manage a new set of ideas and
where were we going in the industry. I don't
think these are fair questions because we had
just as much a leg up on how to manage the
industry as the industry did on how to respond
to us.
DR. LOGSDON:
Indeed. Well, George, you got to Headquarters
in 1963 and you found this group of strong°
willed people by now in Houston, probably
pretty well convinced they knew what they
were doing.
DR. MUELLER:
They were just starting in Houston.
DR. LOGSDON:
And your job was to make them part of an inte-
grated whole, together with Marshall and all of
the other centers, including Kennedy, that were
involved with the program. Do you want to
reflect on what you found when you got there?
DR. MUELLER:
Well, let me start earlier, because we were all
talking about how we got to where we were.
And I actually started in the space business
with William Wooldridge, back when ballistic
missiles were just starting to come into being.
And so my own involvement with the space
activities was to be in charge of building the
first of the lunar probes, Pioneer I, which
unfortunately never made it to the Moon, but
at least it taught us a good deal about what one
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hadto do in orderto accomplishsomething
likethat.
SowhenI cameto NASA,I hada fair back-
groundon the commercial side of the field, as it
were, trying to sell NASA some of these mar-
velous new devices that they really needed in
order to carry out the lunar mission. And per-
haps my major contact at that time was not
with the Manned Spacecraft Center, but with
Marshall Space Flight Center and working with
Wernher von Braun and trying to convince
them that they needed to have something that
we called systems engineering, or an under-
standing of the total system and the interfaces
between the launch vehicle and the spacecraft
and the launch complex, and what needed to be
done in order to make sure that those inter-
faces, when they came together, met the needs
of the overall mission. And that, of course, was
a key in the long run to the success of Apollo
because we did set up a very deep and strict
interface control system that made sure that
when you delivered things to the Cape, almost
always they fit together. And that, I think, was
the most important thing.
So I brought to the program a background in
quite a different arena, that was the Air Force
management arena. And that combination of
the NACA strengths, the old Marshall strengths,
and the Air Force experience, I think, really led
to the ability to complete the mission within the
time scale that we had. And I don't think there
was any doubt that we could have carried out
the mission, given enough time. But to do it
within the decade was more of a challenge. In
the long run, it also permitted us to build a team
that I don't think has been equaled in the world
before or since.
DR. LOGSDON:
But I think it is fair to say that when people
here and in Marshall were first confronted with
your approach to things, like all-up testing and
management of the systems level, there was an
initial skepticism that that was the right way to
do business.
Dr RobertR.Gflruth,
director,NASAManned
SpacecraftCenter,second
fromleft, inAntarcticaat
"ProjectDeepFreeze,"with
(leftto right) D_Faget,Dr
yonBraun,twoDeep
Freezescientists,andDr
ErnstStuhlinger.
(NASAPhoto77-12818.)
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DR. MUELLER:
It was a little more than skepticism, I would
say, but downright disbelief. And, of course,
there were various ways of managing the pro-
gram. One of the things that I remember very
distinctly is the idea of inserting a program
management structure in parallel with the func-
tional structure of the centers. And the amount
of time it took to convince people that that was,
in fact, a good thing to do, and, in my view at
least, was necessary in order to provide the
kinds of communications that were required in
that complex a program in order to be sure that
all those interfaces worked.
And in fact, in order to ensure that communi-
cations structure, for one thing, and for anoth-
er to be sure that people were responsible for
the important functions that were within a pro-
gram, I created this idea of five boxes, the five-
box management structure, which I don't think
was ever widely appreciated, but the idea was
to focus, early on in the program, on the fact
that you were going to test things, and you
ought to design so you can test them. And you
are going to have to have reliability, so you have
to design for reliability.
And you had to have a system, so you had to set
up the interfaces within that system clearly and
fix them so that everyone understood what
those interfaces were. And you had to have pro-
gram control, so somebody was keeping track
of scheduling dollars and what the implications
were. And fmally, you had to have someone
who was worried about when you had all of
this put together, if it will fly and how you will
fly it, so we had to have an operations box. And
we duplicated this down through the structure
in such a way that there were communications
between like disciplines so that you could be
sure that there was the right set of information
flowing up and down the chain in order to be
able to make decisions and to follow the pro-
gram and be sure that everybody was in sync. I
think it worked very well.
DR. LOGSDON:
Dr. Gilruth, in setting up the organization to do
the Manned Spacecraft Center part of the job,
what did you have to do? How were your prior-
ities set? How did you discipline this team to
focus on the job?
DR. GILRUTH:
Well, first we had very good people. And I think
our task was pretty straightforward. We didn't
have to do the big rockets. That was done by
another center. We would have a meeting every
month where we would tell each other what we
were doing and what our problems were, and
made sure that we were going to have good
interfaces.
It wasn't just by luck. We did all of these impor-
tant things, and we were lucky enough that if
we left one out, or so, we found it before it was
too late. And I think we had a very good system.
And the big rockets, we couldn't have had a bet-
ter bunch of people to build those big rockets
than we had there.
DR. LOGSDON:
But the relationships between Houston and
Huntsville were not always amicable.
DR. GILRUTH:
Yes, they were. They were quite amicable for
big organizations like that. We had good friends
at the top, and the people got together once a
month and we, each, told what our problems
were and what we were worrying about in our
own things and what we thought we were wor-
rying about in their own business. So we got
this thing all worked out pretty well every
month. And I generally sat in on those myself.
So I think we had a good set of works and a
good feeling, I don't think we had any of that
where you sometimes see where you have two
big groups working together, supposedly. We
were good friends with the people there and
they were good friends with us.
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DR. LOGSDON:
The five of you, other than George Mueller,
canle from a NACA background. But clearly,
those weren't enough people to do the job. You
had to do a personnel buildup real quick.
Where did the people come from? What were
you looking for in your various units? What
kinds of skills were there? Was there a kind of
personnel base sitting, ready for this kind of
task?
DR. GILRUTH:
Well, I remember they shut down a lot of things
in England and we were able to get a good num-
ber of aeronautical engineers with English
backgrounds but were very bright.
DR. MUELLER:
From Canada, I think. Yes.
DR. GILRUTH:
Very bright. And they didn't have to unlearn a
lot of things that they might otherwise have had
to do. And we got enough people. It was such
an exciting program that a lot of people wanted
to work on it. Our problem was to make sure
that we took the best people and I think our
people did a good job at that.
DR. LOGSDON:
Anybody else want to comment on that?
DR. KRAFT:
Yes, I would like to comment on that. I think
that in terms of manufacturing mad designing
and developing, we tried to hire engineers that
had 5 to 10 years of experience. And we hired a
lot of people. Max hired a great number of peo-
ple. We had the foresight to get people around
him to do our kind of work. And along with the
people that we had from Canada, I think that
was a good nucleus, the organization.
However, in Operations I looked for people
right out of college. That is where I wanted
them from. We, frankly, didn't know quite what
we were going to have to do and what we were
going to have to learn to do that job. And I want
you to know that the average age of my organi-
zation in 1969 was 26. So, we couldn't have got-
ten very many guys with a lot of experience.
We had a lot of guys that had some good expe-
rience at the top. I, at that time, was about 37 or
38 years old, and Bill Tindall, and Sig Sjoberg
about the same. So we were all within the
nucleus of the NACA, and the rest of the guys
we got out of college.
MR. TINDALL:
True. The exact answer was we got them from
Oklahoma and Texas. Everyone wanted to
come down here. That's the truth. And they
might have had one year of experience at China
Lake or something like that. And they all
poured in. But none of us knew anything about
how to really do the job.
DR. LOGSDON:
You all learned together.
MR. TINDALL:
Yes. And there weren't any courses on that in
college on this stuff. There were chemists--
DR. KRAFT:
The other thing I want to stress is we weren't
ignorant to organization in NACA. The aircraft
industry was run by a matrix organization. We
interfaced with those organizations. We kimw
how they operated. They had functional organi-
zations, they had operations organizations, and
they had flight test organizations. We were very
familiar with that. And Bob had grown up with
that sort of firing in his experience. So we had
good knowledge of how to organize, in a func-
tional sense, to get the job done both in research
and design and development and in operations.
So we had, as an example, Bill Tindall, particu-
larly, and myself, in a management sense had to
build a world network. And there was a lot of
money for a big system to send things around the
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world, and contracts around the world to build
something that we didn't set out to know about,
in the beginning. But we designed that with
Western Electric in the Bell labs. So that was a
good management experience also.
MR. TINDALL:
Can I say one thing?
DR. LOGSDON:
Sure.
MR. TINDALL:
Another thing that I think was extraordinary,
and this was throughout the whole manned-
space flight program, was how things were del-
egated down. I mean, NASA responsibilities
were delegated to the people and they, who
didn't know how to do these things, were
expected to go find out how to do it and do it.
And that is what they did. It was just so much
fun to watch these young people take on these
terribly challenging jobs and do them.
DR. KRAFT:
And that stemmed from the top. Bob Gilruth
was that kind of a manager and he taught Chris
Kraft and Max Faget how to manage in the
same sense. We ended up giving a guy a job and
giving him the responsibility to go do it.
DR. FAGET:
Right.
DR. KRAFT:
And I think that everybody had that feeling.
And the other thing you have to realize is there
was a tremendous feeling of openness among
our organizations. We grew up telling each
other we were making mistakes when we made
them. And that is how we learned. It was
extremely important for us to say the mistakes
we made as we made them because that helped
us to grow. And that feeling was very much a
part of our organization.
DR. LOGSDON:
How did that look from Headquarters, George?
Did you feel that you had a group that was
learning as it was growing and building confi-
dence in being able to do the job?
DR. MUELLER:
Oh, I think we had a group that was not only
learning, but was very, very capable. And truth-
fully, that was the secret of success in NASA,
the capability of the individuals involved in all
of the centers because we had some tremen-
dous people down at the Cape as well as in
Huntsville. I think that one other thing that was
instrumental was the fact that we were able to
work quite openly with our contractors, a situ-
ation which is not true today.
DR. LOGSDON:
Very much so.
DR. MUELLER:
It was so important to be able to actually work
with them and to share their problems and be
sure that we knew it well enough so that not
only did they share their problems, but they felt
confident about sharing their problems.
Without that confidence you have got a very
real problem in terms of getting a program
done in a reasonably orderly fashion.
DR. LOGSDON:
I want to talk to the program people about that,
but let me push you one more step on that. How
did you create a political climate in Washington
that allowed that relationship to work?
DR. MUELLER:
You know, it was interesting. We had in
Congress some very strong support, and we
had set up some guiding committees that pro-
vided an oversight. And of course, today you
couldn't set up an Apollo execs group and
probably couldn't even set up the science and
technology advisory group under Charlie
Townes because, after all, there would be
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conflicts of interest you wouldn't believe in
doing that.
And yet, the Apollo execs were very powerful,
not so much that they did everything them-
selves, but they got their organizations geared
around to supporting the activity. And the key
to that was a real understanding on the part of
Congress of what it was we were doing. Every
month I met with Tiger Teague and his commit-
tee to tell them where we stood, what our prob-
lems were the last month, how we were work-
ing around them, and whom we were working
with. So he was well aware of the Apollo execs
group and all of those other things.
At that time, you didn't have the same kind of
constraints in dealing with contractors that we
do today. I don't think there was a single
instance of a contractor taking advantage of this
relationship. In fact, if anything, we took advan-
tage of that relationship to get things done that
we otherwise could never have gotten done.
DR. KRAFT:
And I think that is one of the most broad points
that we have made since we started talking. In
our career as NACAers, and the then first years
of the NASAers, we encouraged a transfer of peo-
ple between the industry and NACA. And if you
looked across the industry, say take 1960, you
would find an awful lot of NACA people in top
level management positions in the industry and,
likewise, a lot of people from the industry that
had come in to NASA to help us manage these
programs. That was encouraged. It ought to be
encouraged today because it was one of the fun-
damental strengths of NASA in those early days.
DR. MUELLER:
Exactly.
DR. LOGSDON:
Owen, what about trying to run a contract to
get a spacecraft built? What was it like in that
environment?
MR. MORRIS:
Well, it was pretty hectic at the time. There
were the same kinds of meetings that every-
body is talking about, where you would get
together on a frequent basis comparing notes
about what the problems were, what anybody
could do to help the situation. And there was a
spirit of cooperation pretty much throughout
the program.
There was a little bit of rough edges initially
when the contracts were first let, but those
were rubbed off quite early. From then on, it
was really a team operation. And I think the
point I was making earlier about communica-
tions, I think, was one of the bigger issues
throughout the whole program. Being able to
build a team and get people to talk with each
other, and get a response out of government, or
industry, or the services, or whomever could
give a hand, were some of the keys in being
able to do it in the kind of time span that we
had.
There were a lot of program management tech-
niques learned that were foreign to many of us
who were primarily from engineering and
research backgrounds. I think those techniques
were developed in the early '60s, and by '63 or
'64 they were pretty well-honed and in place.
And the organization that Dr. Mueller talked
about, the five boxes throughout the NASA
structure and in most of the contractor struc-
ture, also gave a very good point of contact,
kind of an input. Anywhere you wanted to go
within the organization there was a counterpart
whether you knew him or not. Whether you had
ever met the man, you knew that if you called
that box, he had that same kind of responsibili-
ty and you could talk to him and get communi-
cation going.
DR. MUELLER:
You know, one thing I would like to remark on
is contract structure. One of the things we did
was convert the contracts we had, some of
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them were cost plus and some were fixed price,
into incentive contracts. Incentive contracts
perhaps are not used today as we used them.
We used them as a means of communication,
hard communications. Because we set what we
wanted to incentivize, that got the attention of
our contractor structure. And it also got our
attention because we had to think through
exactly what it was we wanted.
MR. MORRIS:
Well said.
DR. LOGSDON:
Max, how did your engineering organization
here relate to the technical skills of the con-
tractors? What was the balance of design and
engineering choice?
DR. FAGET:
Well, in both the Mercury and of course the
Gemini and Apollo programs, I think we were
ahead of the contractors. As a matter of fact,
before we even put the RFP out, we pretty
much knew what we wanted and stated it. The
Apollo Command Module was designed more
or less by our people.
DR. LOGSDON:
No elaborate Phase A, Phase B kind of struc-
ture?
DR. FAGET:
Well, we had a contract with industry to look
at the Apollo design and we ran an in-house
design at the same time. We had three con-
tractors doing what would now be called a
Phase B contract. We ran our own in-house
design. And, of course, we kind of took advan-
tage of what our contractors were doing dur-
ing this time and were continually taking the
best parts of their designs and putting them in.
So when the final design came out, it didn't
look like any of theirs, but was one we had
confidence in.
We made some very fundamental decisions
during that period of time. One of biggest fun-
damental decisions that very few people appre-
ciated is that we decided, firmly decided, that
we would not use pumps to operate our rocket
engines and that we would use hypergolic pro-
pellants, just simply because those had all of
the characteristics to provide the greatest
amount of reliability.
We got criticized roundly by a number of con-
tractors and others, particularly the engine peo-
ple. They had designed all these wonderful
pump-fed engines. Pratt & Whitney in particular
had a beautiful engine that ran on hydrogen and
oxygen. And the engine demonstrated reliability.
I remember a number of times they came to fuss
at me and asked why aren't you using my engine.
And I said the reason I'm not using your engine
is that the engine is not the propulsion system.
The propulsion system includes the hydrogen
and the oxygen and all of that, and I don't know
how they keep all that stuff ready to be used
throughout a mission that has got a number of
firings. The engine will work, but I don't know
that the rest of the propulsion system will work.
So we deliberately used less than the highest
performance because it provided the simplest in
a system where we could have the greatest reli-
ability. We made a number of decisions.
In other areas, NASA was well-funded then. Our
development laboratories were well-funded. We
had what we called back-up systems being
developed in our laboratories, directly under
contract from the engineering department. And
quite often we ended up having the contractor
go to another subcontractor. They had the back-
up system, instead of going with the original
simply because the development wasn't going
along as well. So the engineering organization in
many ways kind of stayed ahead of the technol-
ogy, or at least even with the technology, and
was ready to stand in there and plug up some of
the deficiencies that occurred during the devel-
opment program.
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DR. KRAFT:
I think one of the biggest strengths of the
Johnson Space Center was what Max was just
referring to. I would like to have him speak a lit-
tle more to the fact that what we were doing
with the f'mances we had was building our-
selves a team of guys that were just as good or
better because we were hands-on people. I
would like to have Max talk to that because it is
an extremely important point.
DR. LOGSDON:
That was the point I was driving at. Whether
you got pressure to change from the outside, or
whether the contractors said hey, these folks
are telling us how to do our business, that
strong engineering core was essential to the
ability to carry off the mission.
DR. FAGET:
Yes, we did get pressure to change it. And I am
going to be very frank. I think most of the pres-
sure came from Headquarters. Headquarters
wanted to do studies, we wanted to do devel-
opment. So we spent an awful lot of money on
studies, and we studied things to death -
DR. LOGSDON:
With not much intent to do anything about it.
DR. FAGET:
With the Apollo program. I can show you stud-
ies of space stations, and everything else that
was done back then. And it didn't lead to any-
thing because there wasn't enough money to
follow through. And when we did want to do
something, quite often the most practical sys-
tem to do it was nonexistent because the devel-
opment work wasn't done. The NACA did an
awful lot of development work in that laborato-
ry. Of course, I came from that background. I
am not going to say that I am completely right,
but I know one thing in my own mind. In my
own mind, that is the best way to do it. And we
didn't do it that way after a while.
DR. KRAFT:
Max, let's go a little further there. I think that
what we recognize, from Mercury to Gemini to
Apollo, was that we needed a certain percent-
age of the funds to do these kinds of things in
Max's laboratory which gave our people
straight, hands-on knowledge, first-hand
knowledge, and it allowed us to build systems
that we built at the time of Mercury to use in
Gemini and at the time of Gemini to use in
Apollo. The perfect example of that is the fuel
cell. The fuel cells that we used in Apollo were
developed with Gemini money.
And so it was extremely important. The fuel
cells that we used in the shuttle were devel-
oped with Apollo money. And that was a con-
cept we all preserved, all of us sitting right here
said it was a great thing to do because it gives
our guys the great knowledge of how to build
these systems and work on designs. So they are
just as good as the guys out there that are doing
it at the same time. That was a tremendous
thing. And we just weren't able to continue and
that really hurt NASA.
DR. LOGSDON:
Why not? Is it basically a question of money or
is there something that underpins the money?
DR. FAGET:
It is a question of money because he who has
the money makes the decisions on how it is
going to be spent. The money in the present
NASA system is spread out among the organi-
zations at Headquarters, they in turn have
their channels of spending the money, and
ultimately a lot of the say of how that money
is spent is made by people up at Headquarters
without much hands-on experience. They
have a lot of theoretical experience. They are
well-educated. | know that. But very few of
them have ever really done anything and they
are making all the decisions on how the
money is being spent.
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DR. KRAFT:
We can't over-emphasize that point because
that was the strength of Marshall, of KSC, and
ourselves that they worked in that kind of a
fashion. And it dried up post-Apollo. And it real-
ly hurt us, and it was because of money
because we didn't have enough to support the
program itself. So when we started trying to
siphon off some of that for future technology,
we could not do it. It just went away.
MR. TINDALL:
We didn't hire anyone during the entire '70s, for
crying out loud.
MR. MORRIS:
Might be made along these lines. One was that
they were saying a lot of the hardware built for
Gemini came from Mercury development,
Apollo built on Gemini, the Shuttle built on
Apollo. The fmancial support was much bigger
in those days, and the guy managing the Gemini
prograni could afford to invest in developing
better systems which he might use or the next
guy might use.
As the budgets got tight in the late '60s and on
into the '70s, the program manager was faced
with the problem that he either had to put the
money directly into his program or have his
program suffer materially to foster develop-
ment for the next program coming down the
line, and it was very easy to see where he was
going make his decision. I think that is one of
the problems the agency has had.
DR. KRAFT:
You probably have a lot to say about that
because I think you had a lot to do with making
sure that took place. I mean, you understood
that was a necessary element of what we were
doing and you could see that as good expendi-
tures of funds.
DR. MUELLER:
I have been surprised that there has been no
recognition in NASA over the years that the
important thing is the investment in technolo-
gy, because that is where we, looking back now,
I had the opportunity of going around and see-
ing what has been done in the last 20 years. And
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in theApolloera,one of the things that we did
insist on was sufficient funds, free funds from
the centers, to make decisions about where to
put development money. And so we had, essen-
tially in every center, an ability to spend money
on development of future things. Looking back,
going back 20 years, what I find is that over that
period of time, somehow or another, all of our
engineers have become contract managers and
almost none of them now go out in the lab and
do some work.
MR. MORRIS:
Amen. Yes.
DR. MUELLER:
And even in our so-called research centers,
they have become contract managers.
MR. MORRIS:
Men.
DR. MUELLER:
And they keep going out and getting contracts
instead of going out and doing technology. And
that is a serious weakness. I mean, it affects the
whole structure of NASA in a way that, I think,
is very detrimental.
DR. KRAFT:
Very profound. Very profound.
DR. MUELLER:
Yes.
DR. LOGSDON:
Let's talk about risk management for a little
while, risks both in developing the systems and
then operating them. What kind of attitude per-
meated the organization as you approached
this task? How did you make your trade-offs? I
don't even know who to ask to start that dis-
cussion. I am sure you were all involved.
DR. FAGET:
There was a great deal of risk.
DR. GILRUTH:
In what we were doing. No question about it.
Something brand new in a place man had never
seen, man had never been. And it was all new
and it was tough.
DR. MUELLER:
And we had a lot of help, those who helped us
to do reliability analysis and prove that every-
thing was going to work perfectly.
DR. GILRUTH:
Yes.
DR. MUELLER:
Or else we wouldn't fly.
MR. TINDALL:
But we also had backup systems for everything,
or almost everything that we could. And I know
when it came to our planning missions and pro-
cedures and all of the software in the mission
control center and things like that, at least, it
must have been 80 percent or maybe 90 percent
was spent on nonnominal situations. Everyone
was trying to figure out what are you going to
do if this happens, what are you going to do if
that happens, work through the system rules, if
the system was working or not working, and
how do you decide, and all of that. And not just
one source of information, but usually we
would triple or quad it.
DR. KRAFT:
You know, the thing that I want to say about
this risk business is that I think this numbers
game, as George is implying, was greatly over-
played, is greatly over-played. And the way I felt
about it was the following, and I think Max
would back me up. We said to ourselves that
we have now done everything we know to do.
We feel comfortable with all of the unknowns
that we went into this program with. We know
there may be some unknown unknowns, but
we don't know what else to do to make this
thing risk-free, so it is time to go.
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DR. GILRUTH:
That's right. That's right.
DR. KRAFT:
And I can't say it any differently than that. I
think if any of us, Bob Gilruth from the top,
myseff, or any of us, Max Faget felt, well we
don't know what we are doing here. We don't
know the answer to that and we should know
the answer, there was no question in our minds
we weren't going to do it no matter what. We
were going to wait. We'll walt and we'll walt
and we'll walt. But when we feel like we are
ready to go, to hell with this risk analysis busi-
ness. We have done everything we can. Let's go
do it.
DR. LOGSDON:
Are there examples where you did walt?
DR. KRAFT:
Of course.
DR. FAGET:
Oh, sure.
DR. LOGSDON:
Talk about a couple.
DR. FAGET:
Some of the unknown risks, of course, we dealt
with by making unmanned flights to test out the
systems, parachutes and things like that. We
realized you make a parachute that's 60 feet in
diameter and you are going to deploy it at one
time, that was something kind of new. And if
you are going to hang-glide three people on that
thing, you better damn well test it. And so we
had a very sensible, thorough test program to
make sure that those parachutes would work.
When it came to risk management, I always had
an awful lot of trouble with some people coming
in and telling me about redundancy and every-
thing else. I always took the attitude that gosh, I
am supposed to be an engineer. And if I am an
engineer, I better damn well understand what
reliability and what failure means, otherwise I
am not an engineer. And I expect the engineers
that work for me to take the same attitude.
And that goes back to the propulsion systems.
We took exactly that attitude before we even
had the specifications for RFP, we had decided
on what kind of propulsion system we were
going to use because we could go through that.
And by picking the pressure-fed hypergolic
propulsion system, we could see the least num-
ber of conflicts. And then we said okay, you
can't have redundant tanks. You simply can't
carry twice as much propellant, fire what you
need and throw away haft of it. It is pretty hard
to have redundant thrust chambers. But every-
thing else besides the tanks and the thrust
chambers and some of the propellant lines
were all redundant. We had redundant valves,
quad-redundant valves, everything else. Check
valves, you bet we had those things redundant.
And from that standpoint, the same thing in the
pressure feed system. And so I basically said
the best way to deal with risk management is in
the basic conceptual design, get the damn risk
out of it. And I think that is what made the pro-
gram a success.
DR. MUELLER:
I guess I had been point man on this reliability
analysis since the Apollo days because I got
involved with the president's science adviser in
his insisting that we do a complete reliability
analysis. You have to look at it in two ways. One
is that each of these flights is a unique event.
So statistical analysis has a limited utility in try-
ing to define what the probability of success of
one single event is. And that is one thing. But
another thing, that Max touched on, is that the
place to use the reliability analysis is in the
design process. You can't measure reliability in,
you have got to design it in. And once you have
got it designed and it is built in, from then on,
whatever else you do is just window dressing,
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asfar asI amconcerned.Now,I will temper
that,though,bysayingthatoneof the impor-
tant thingsoneneedsto do is to recognize
whenyouhaveafailureandbesureyoureally
understandindepthwhatthatfailureisdueto
andmakesureyouhavefixedit to makesureit
doesn'thappenagain.
MR. MORRIS:
Amen.
DR. KRAFT:
Part of the creed.
DR. FAGET:
I couldn't agree with you more, George. And
one of the things that you want to do is make
sure that you have enough testing. You are
bound to have blind spots. There isn't any engi-
neer that I know of, God or not, that is not
going to make some human errors. So you have
to have testing to pick up those blind spots.
And if you don't do those tests and if you don't
believe what you see in those tests, you are in
trouble. And I will give you a good example of
when we did that was on the solid rocket
motor. That was a blind spot. We designed in
failure, and I would not hold a design engineer
to fault for that failure system, but I would hold
those that came after the design.
So you need a good design. You have to come in
with a good, basic design. What you might call
testing, and a reliability audit, if I might use
those words, as opposed to really saying, you
know, it is no good until I approve it is right, as
a second man coming in. An audit is good
because it gives a second party a chance to
look at what you have done. But it ought to be
done by good engineering heads as opposed to
a bunch of mathematicians.
DR. KRAFT:
I know you don't want us to tell war stories, but
I have to tell a story in that regard. We arrived at
a management council meeting in Washington
around noon. And this guy right here has a bunch
of papers sitting in front of each of our desks that
said could you please give me the reliability
number associated with risk, at each one of the
phases of the mission, and they were launch,
translunar injection, orbital coast, etc., etc. The
only thing that you and I want to remember
about those numbers is two things. Number one,
George Low and Chris Kraft got the identical
number in the total listing of what was going to
come, and I am not going to tell you what that
number was. And I also want to say that George
MueUer tore all those goddamn pieces of paper
up and never asked us that again.
DR. LOGSDON:
There was a difference in test philosophy. Dr.
Mueller brought with him the idea of all-up test-
ing, testing as many systems as possible at one
time. What if you had earlier had a large failure
in one of the all-up tests? What would that have
done to the program?
DR. MUELLER:
We would have found out what failed, and we
did, as a matter of fact, have a real failure. I will
say we did. We found out what failed and we
fixed it.
DR. KRAFT:
And we put a man on it the next time we flew
it.
DR. MUELLER:
Exactly.
DR. FAGET:
Hindsight is a wonderful thing. I thought that
was a good idea. Even at the time I thought it
was a good idea. But I believe that anything that
works is bound to be a good idea. But it is a mat-
ter of being bold. It was a bold ide& You know,
you can do step by step testing, a kind of sure-fly
way. There is a risk. If you do an all-up test and
you have a major failure, you might not be able
to fred out what failed. And that is your risk.
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DR. MUELLER:
Yes, that's the real risk.
DR. FAGET:
The stand point of the ultimate risks to the
crew in the all-up test provides just as much of
a safety audit or a confidence as a bunch of sep-
arate tests. And in many ways it is better
because it has the systems working against
each other. But it doesn't undergo this one risk,
which thank God we didn't run into, when we
ended up with a big failure and we couldn't fig-
ure out what gave it.
DR. KRAFT:
That was a significant thing. That was a char-
acteristic of our organization at the time. Our
ability to fly the Saturn V after we had had a
major malfunction on the SII stage, which we
did the previous time before we flew Apollo 8.
And that took a lot of guts, a lot of nerve, but I
think we knew what we were doing. And we
looked at that and said the risk is worth the
gain. That would be extremely difficult to do in
the environment that exists today.
DR. LOGSDON:
That is what I would like to pull out a little bit.
We are risk adverse now. What allowed you to
be bold?
DR. FAGET:
What we are all saying is that there is a time to
be conservative and a time to be bold. And
judgment, good judgment, tells you when to do
it. And of course, we had great judgment.
DR. KRAFT:
But you are right. I don't think there was a soul
in any level of management in our organiza-
tions that I know of that was opposed to flying
Apollo 8.
DR. FAGET:
No.
DR. KRAFT:
I cannot think of a single soul that was opposed
to flying Apollo--
DR. MUELLER:
The only ones were the media.
DR. KRAFT:
But I am talking of when we got there. I mean,
there were a lot of questions about it until we
got there. George Mueller says you guys have
lost your minds when we first thought that up.
But when we got there and we said we were
going to go, there was not a single question as
to whether we were going.
DR. MUELLER:
We wouldn't have gone if there had been.
MR. MORRIS:
That's right. If there were a question we would
not have done it.
DR. KRAFT:
It only took one voice to say we weren't going.
DR. MUELLER:
Exactly. But let me just say I don't think that
we were not risk aversive at the time of
Apollo. In fact, we spent a great deal of time,
energy, and effort being sure that we under-
stood the risks. So it wasn't that we were just
boldly marching out where angels feared to
tread. We really understood what our system
was.
So today, we may be not willing to take any
risk, but in that case, you can't fly because
there is always going to be risk. And to think
that the shuttle is risk-free would be a major
mistake. Even the best of solid rocket technol-
ogy eventually has a failure. And even the best
of liquid rocket technology eventually has a
failure. So you have got to expect that you are
going to have failures in the future.
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DR. LOGSDON:
Well, you had a traumatic failure. You lost a
crew in the Apollo 1 fire. What did that change?
DR. MUELLER:
It changed our test procedure for one thing.
MR. MORRIS:
Well, we tightened up.
DR. LOGSDON:
But did it change the way you could do your
business?
MR. MORRIS:
We tightened up.
DR. LOGSDON:
Had you gotten a little loose?
MR. MORRIS:
Yes, yes.
DR. KRAFT:
I think it changed the way we did our business.
MR. MORRIS:
It sure did. I think the configuration manage-
ment received a lot more attention after the
fire. We had reasonably good configuration
management before. In the interest of time,
there were a lot of changes made and the
paperwork caught up with it afterwards. There
were a lot of small changes that were really not
reviewed in great detail. As a result of the acci-
dent, the fire, the procedures were really tight-
ened up. And I think it was all to the good of the
program. I think it helped--
DR. LOGSDON:
Kind of a brutal reminder.
MR. MORRIS:
The program matured much more rapidly from
that point on because the rigor was in there.
DR. KRAFT:
Well, I think the other point you have to make
there is that, let's admit to the fact that we were
running our fannies off trying to do Apollo. And
it was difficult for us to take the lessons
learned in Mercury and Gemini and apply them
back into Apollo as we designed it and as we
built it because it was tough, just tough to do
from a communications point of view, right?
Now, when we had the fire, I think we took a
step back in and said okay, what are these les-
sons that we have learned from Mercury and
Gemini. What lessons have we learned from
this horrible tragedy. And now let's pump that
back and be doubly sure that we are going to do
it right the next time. And I think that that fact
right there is what allowed us to get Apollo
done in the '60s.
DR. MUELLER:
Right. I think one thing you ought to recognize
is it wasn't just that we fixed the fire, we fLxed
everything else we could fred that had any pos-
sibility of being lrLxed.
MR. MORRIS:
Right.
DR. LOGSDON:
And you found some other things that needed
fLxing.
DR. MUELLER:
A whole large number of things.
DR. KRAFT:
One hundred and twenty-five of them.
DR. MUELLER:
Yes, a large number.
MR. TINDALL:
You know, I am not sure what risk management
is. If it is only dealing with the spacecraft sys-
tems, well that has been discussed. But I think
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we are leaving out something that is pretty darn
important, and that is how you operate the
vehicle and the people and all of the rest of it
after that.
I think one of the greatest contributors to min-
imizing risk was the extraordinary amount of
training that was done, high-fidelity simulations
that were extraordinary. And there is no ques-
tion about it, they saved us. I mean really saved
us many, many times because I don't think
there was a single mission that we didn't have
some significant failures. The fact was that
people could figure them out because they had
been trained and knew how to work with each
other. The communications were there, the
procedures were there to figure out what to do
in real time and get the thing going. And most
of the time when those things happened, the
outside world didn't even know about it.
DR. LOGSDON:
Bill, when you came to plan how to actually fly
these missions, and maybe Chris will want to
comment on this also, were you happy with
what the engineers had given you? Did you
have systems that were ready to go?
MR. TINDALL:
Yes. There were practically no changes that I
can recall that we went back and asked for in
the spacecraft systems. I am not saying that
there weren't any. There were maybe one or
two pretty minor ones, minor ones and easily
fixed ones. As far as I could tell, the spacecraft
were safe.
DR. MUELLER:
I have a different view of that, as a matter of
fact, because all through the design of the
spacecraft the astronauts and the flight opera-
tors were involved in it. So we had a lot of
changes in the design process.
MR. TINDALL:
During the design process, yes.
DR. KRAFT:
It was an iterative process there.
DR. MUELLER:
Right.
MR. MORRIS:
It was not a question of the designers and the
builders then turning it over to the operations
guys and them saying "what is this stuff?." They
had been in it from the conceptual design, from
the specification writing.
DR. MUELLER:
Sure, right.
MR. MORRIS:
When we sat down to write the specifications,
we wanted the operations people right in the
middle of it.
DR. KRAFT:
We argued over the instrumentation we want-
ed. We had a lot of arguments back and forth.
MR. MORRIS:
Sure.
DR. KRAFT:
But by the time it got to Bill Tindall's technique
development, we accepted what we got and
used that as a set of mission limitations just as
you would in the envelope of an airplane or
anything else.
MR. MORRIS:
Right, right.
DR. KRAFT:
But before we got to that point, it was very
much an iterative process.
DR. LOGSDON:
Max, you wanted to say something?
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DR. FAGET:
Well, I just was going to say
in a different way than
everybody else that we did
have an integrated team.
We did have a continuous
sequence of design reviews
where the engineering peo-
ple from my organization,
the program management
team, and the operation
team would all participate.
And it was really an open
forum. The program man-
agement team was the only
one who would make the decision, but everyone
could speak as long as he was unsatisfied with
what was going on.
DR. MUELLER:
It's true.
DR. FAGET:
And stated his views. And then everyone would
discuss those views, whether they were rea-
sonable or unreasonable. And then the program
managers would make a decision.
MR. MORRIS:
That's right.
DR. FAGET:
And that brought a lot of operational consider-
ation into everything that we did from the
standpoint of how the systems were designed.
MR. MORRIS:
Certainly.
DR. FAGET:
They were designed to operate, to work, and, of
course, to be reliable.
DR. LOGSDON:
Were there any major differences in the com-
mand and service module contract and devel-
opment and the lunar module development?
They were different spacecraft for specialized
functions with different contractors. You hear
a lot about the relationship between Houston
and North American at the time. You hear
very little discussion about the relationship
between Houston and Grumman and the lunar
module. Is there anything worth talking about
there?
MR. MORRIS:
I think probably the biggest reason for that was
that the lunar module was started later. The
command module had two years of that con-
tract underway before the lunar module was
placed under contract. So a lot of the rough
edges had been worn off. The team here at
Houston and the team at Rockwell was much
better at that point in time.
DR. KRAFT:
I don't doubt what you say is true, but what you
say is a misconception. I don't think that is
right. I think there was just as intimate a feeling
between the organizations all across the board
at Grnmman as there was a--
DR. LOGSDON:
Well, I am not suggesting a detach. It is just that
nobody seems to talk about the positive char-
acter of that relationship.
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DR.KRAFT:
Well, let me tell you what we did. We discussed
this, because I was at the management council
meeting, as a total thing, both command mod-
ule, service module, software operations. We
always did a data dump for George every time
we had one of those meetings.
But I wanted to describe another meeting, and
that was that once a month, and sometimes more
often, George Low had a round robin, and we got
on an airplane. He had a Configuration Control
Board meeting, and once a month it was held at
Grumman and at Rockwell. And both Grumman
and Rockwell people attended those meetings.
We would fly from here to Grununan, have an all-
day meeting, get on an airplane, fly all night, have
the same meeting in California with Rockwell
and fly home. And that was done all the time. So
everybody was familiar with what was going on
in all of those contracts as far as we were con-
cerned. A very important thing to happen.
DR. MUELLER:
And Grumman had a fair number of problems
also.
MR. MORRIS:
Oh, sure.
DR. MUELLER:
It was just that we worked them a little harder
and earlier.
MR. MORRIS:
And we knew how to go about them a little bit
better.
DR. MUELLER:
Right.
MR. MORRIS:
We were a little bit more experienced, too.
DR. LOGSDON:
You were learning from what had gone on before.
MR. MORRIS:
Yes, from our previous experience, yes. Sure.
DR. LOGSDON:
Let's talk about flying the missions for a while.
You mentioned earlier, a couple of you, the
Apollo 8 decision, the decision to commit a
crew to a circumlunar, a lunar orbit flight with
the frost manned mission of the Saturn V. What
would have happened if there had been a major
problem there. What would that have done to
the program?
DR. MUELLER:
Define problem.
DR. KRAFT:
Well, if we had had a similar malfunction on
Apollo 8 as we had on Apollo 13, we would
have been in a hell of a mess. And God knows
what that would have done to the program.
Anybody could give his or her own guess to
that. So that would have been terrible.
DR. LOGSDON:
How risky did you feel that choice was. You
earlier said no one in the organization down
here stood up and said no.
DR. KRAFT:
It had a certain amount of risk to it. However,
remember that that also was a human failure.
There was not a damn thing wrong with the
hardware that caused Apollo 13 to fail, it was
those idiots that treated the hardware improp-
erly and caused that malfunction to take place.
DR. LOGSDON:
And there was not a thing you could do about
that then.
DR. KRAFT:
That's right. As Max just described a tittle while
ago, those are human frailties. But the Apollo 8
thing, I think, was one of the most fantastic exam-
pies of good management that I have ever seen.
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DR. MUELLER:
I thought that was one of the turning points in
the program and one of the best things that we
did.
MR. MORRIS:
Sure was.
DR. MUELLER:
Although these guys would never believe it, I
was enthusiastic about that mission from the
time I first heard about it. But I used it as a
lever to make sure that everybody did their
homework and we were certain that it was all
going to be all right.
DR. LOGSDON:
Were you ready from a flight ops point of view
to take on that mission?
MR. TINDALL:
Absolutely.
DR. KRAFT:
Well, we made ourselves ready, I think, is the
right way to put it. I mean, when first asked, I
probably, in Bob's office, got red in the face.
And three days later told him we are "go." So
that is the way it went.
DR. FAGET:
I didn't have anything to do with planning that
mission, but I can just remember one thing.
When that bird went behind the Moon and it
was supposed to make a burn in the dark and I
had to sit there and wait until it came back into
the clear, that was a very exciting, high heart-
rate time for me.
MR. MORRIS:
That was a long pass.
DR. KRAFT:
It was particularly for me, too, because the
sequence of the thing was as follows. When we
got to thinking about doing the thing and
George Low asked us what we could do to go
around the Moon, when the ops guys got
together, we decided look, we are having a hell
of a lot of trouble with this lunar orbit determi-
nation. We have been looking at the lunar
obiter data, and we can't figure out where the
spacecraft is when it comes back around. We
are several thousand feet off. And if we are
going to be that way for the whole mission, we
are going to be in trouble because we won't
know where to start the descent.
So we said look, if we are going to do this mis-
sion, let's really get something out of it. So
let's go and orbit around the Moon. Now,
there were a lot of white-faced astronauts
when we said that. But nevertheless, we again
said that we thought that risk was worth the
gain. And it was. That was the flight that we
learned an empirical method for doing an
orbit determination around the Moon and
really put us ahead of the game. Apollo 8 gave
us all, I am talking about engineering, pro-
gram management, top management, opera-
tions, it gave us all a tremendous feeling of
confidence that we knew what we were doing
after that situation.
MR. TINDALL:
We knew what we were doing, we had proce-
dures laid out, we tried to imagine every single
conceivable failure that could occur and what
we were going to do about them. We did things
like lunar orbit insertion in two stages instead
of one big burn because an overburn that might
go undetected would cause it to crash into the
Moon. So we backed off and did a two-burn.
I mean, things like that, that we could tolerate
some pretty significant problems. I don't
know what would have happened if we had
been hit by lightening like we were on Apollo
12, but the fact of the matter was we could
have gone ahead and flown. We might not
have had the guts later in the program to do
that, but Lord.
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DR. MUELLER:
Of course, we had a free return trajectory.
MR. TINDALL:
Free return until you fired the SPS.
DR. LOGSDON:
Dr. Gilruth, by this time were you beginning to
be convinced that this was going to work? I say
that a little facetiously.
DR. GILRUTH:
I was always a great worrier.
DR. MUELLER:
We all were.
DR. GILRUTH:
I felt that it was much better to be a great wor-
rier than a person that didn't have a trouble.
And of course, a person either worries or he
doesn't. Some people don't worry about things.
I happen to be one that worries very, very
much, especially on things like flying men to
the Moon. We had a lot of worriers in there and
most of them hid it quite well. And I hid it pret-
ty well, too, except when I would be all-alone
with some close friends.
MR. TINDALL:
Kind of like what I was doing.
They called me a professional
pessimist.
MR. MORRIS:
Yes, right.
DR. KRAFT:
That's another profound thing,
in my opinion. I think that the
thing we learned, and the
thing that made us strong, was
that we knew about failure.
We recognized failure, we
knew it was there, we always
looked for it.
MR. MORRIS:
That's right.
DR. KRAFT:
And everything we did was based on decisions
on failure rather than success. And if you want
my opinion, that is what happened to NASA in
the Challenger accident, their decisions were
based on success, and the people sitting right
here made decisions based on failure. And that
may sound crazy as hell, but I believe that is the
way we did it.
MR. MORRIS:
That is what we spent our time on.
DR. KRAFT:
That's right.
DR. LOGSDON:
And the attitude clearly is very different today.
DR. LOGSDON:
Why? What were the elements in the climate in
which you worked that made it possible to
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operateworryingaboutfailurebutanticipating
success,I guess,andbeingfreeto dothat,not
havingtopromisesuccess?
DR. KRAFT:
It is what we have been saying. We all, there is
not a soul here or was in our organizations that
felt like they couldn't say what they wanted to
say any time they wanted to say it and felt total-
ly comfortable about it. We grew, that was our
heritage. It was the way we thought. We were
never embarrassed about it. We were never
embarrassed about being made a fool of when
we made mistakes because we made them. I
mean, we made hundreds of them. But we were
used to being open about them. And that was
fundamental to getting our job done.
MR. TINDALL:
And in fact, it is eScactly the opposite. If some-
one were to have found hidden problems and
not bring them out, that was the worst kind of
person to have around.
MR. MORRIS:
Amen.
MR. TINDALL:
Absolutely the worst.
DR. LOGSDON:
And you felt, as a center here, you could take
that attitude and Headquarters would let you?
DR. GILRUTH:
Well, we didn't ask them. We did it. We couldn't
have operated any other way than that.
DR. MUELLER:
Well, Headquarters couldn't have operated any
other way either.
MR. MORRIS:
Well, I think that it rather than injured us, we
were encouraged.
DR. GILRUTH:
We didn't have any trouble from Headquarters.
They thought we were doing right.
DR. KRAFT:
I don't think that any of us felt the least bit
inhibited in saying what we thought. A lot of
people didn't like it, but at least they respected
us for it.
DR. LOGSDON:
During the program, was money ever a con-
straint?
MR. MORRIS:
Oh, sure.
MR. TINDALL:
No.
MR. MORRIS:
Not nearly to the same extent as it was on the
shuttle and is today on the space station. But
yes, money was a constraint, from 1964 on it
became more and more of a constraint.
DR. LOGSDON:
What kind? I mean, Bill said no and you say yes.
MR. MORRIS:
Well, comparatively speaking, I would say no.
And I would try to qualify that. The number of
backup systems that you were able to fund, the
amount of hardware that you were able to
build, was somewhat constrained. It never got
to the point that you violated some of the real
premises of the program, and I think that one of
the things that allowed us to transcend a num-
ber of lines in the reliability industry was the
failure analysis that we did. Any time we had a
failure, we spent whatever it took to truly
understand that failure and truly understand
that it was fixed before we let go of it. Those
kinds of things we always had money for.
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In later programs, instead of testing the hard-
ware, in many cases it was qualified by what
was called similarity. It was like another part,
an engineer made a judgment that it was close
enough or it wasn't close enough, and that was
it. That was the end of the testing. There was
none. And so they had, later on, those kinds of
monetary constraints. And in Apollo, we never
did that. But yes, there were monetary con-
straints that were put on and there was a
regime in which you had to live.
MR. TINDALL:
Sure, but it came after the mission success was
way at the very top.
MR. MORRIS:
Oh, yes. Yes.
MR. TINDALL:
And schedule was pretty high up there.
MR. MORRIS:
Yes, absolutely.
DR. FAGET:
But there was funding to take.
MR. TINDALL:
Well, we could,
money.
I suppose, have used more
MR. MORRIS:
Well, we did not do some things that we would
like to have done. We were able to do every-
thing that we felt was necessary.
DR. MUELLER:
I can't think of many.
MR. MORRIS:
Well, we got done what was necessary.
DR. KRAFT:
I don't know if I should get within an inch of
that. We were the guys that were always bring-
ing in the money problems. And we weren't the
least bit inhibited for bringing in the money
problems, either.
DR. FAGET:
We always seemed to never have the money for
travel and we never had enough billets for the
people that we wanted.
DR. MUELLER:
Well, billets were really outside our control.
The travel, I have never understood why we
ever curtailed travel. But that also was outside
of my control at the time. There was some dic-
tum by President Johnson that people shouldn't
travel.
MR. TINDALL:
Yes, those damn GSA cars out
Arlington. I mean, that was so bad.
there in
DR. FAGET:
George, you never heard this, but I remember
one time we were having trouble with travel
and I was talking to one of your money con-
trollers, I don't know who it was, but I
explained to him that we were really in a hard
way. And he had some data. He said well, the
people at JSC travel more per capita than any
other center. And I said well, you have proven
another point, we don't have the people.
DR. MUELLER:
True enough, as a matter of fact. Although, the
centers' population seems to even out over
time, I have noticed. But it is true that people
regulating things in Washington often create a
regulation that has zero relationship to the real
needs of a program, for example. And travel
was one of them. We worked our way around
that in every way we possibly could.
DR. GILRUTH:
But that wasn't in the way of a budget limita-
tion.
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DR. MUELLER:
Exactly.
DR. GILRUTH:
So was the head count.
DR. MUELLER:
But I must say that we always found money
enough for some odd things, like that swim-
ming pool that was built down at Huntsville.
DR. LOGSDON:
The neutral buoyancy simulator.
DR. KRAFT:
And we traded monies around in terms of trav-
el, too. We traded monies back and forth among
organizations. It was tight.
DR. FAGET:
But we got by.
DR. LOGSDON:
Once you started flying, what were the prob-
lems? You had to make a decision, I guess, as to
how many missions to fly and what the objec-
tives of each one were. Let's talk about that a
little bit.
DR. GILRUTH:
The decision was made before we started fly-
ing. And I don't think we had to change it much.
DR. KRAFT:
No, I think George Mueller, in his reginmntation
of us, set out a class of missions---A, B, C, D--
that from the very beginning we all participated
in with a great amount of discussion and work.
We had certain goals and objectives we were
going to get out of each class of missions and set
those beforehand. Frankly, I don't think any of us
expected that each one of those would be done
with one flight, but that's the way it tin-ned out.
We were able to build on our experience and
learned from each one of those things and we
didn't have to do that. I think we were very,
very fortunate, though, that we didn't. I don't
think any of us expected to land on Apollo 11
as simply and as straightforwardly as we did.
| think we all expected that we would have to
do maybe one or two flights in A and maybe
two flights in B and two flights in C. But as we
pointed out, Apollo 8 really gave us the turn-
ing point in the program to make that differ-
ently. That sort of gave us a different mindset,
I suppose.
DR. MUELLER:
The only glitch was Apollo 13.
MR. MORRIS:
Right.
DR. MUELLER:
And that was one of those things that should
never happen anyhow.
MR. MORRIS:
That's right.
DR. LOGSDON:
But did Apollo 13 hasten the end of the flighks?
DR. MUELLER:
Let me just say that the real problem that we
had was the support of the scientific communi-
ty and their feeling that all of this money was
being wasted on manned space flight and man
landing on the Moon early on. That is before we
started flying and landing.
MR. TINDALL:
Yes, very much so. That was a great problem
for all of us.
DR. MUELLER:
And then, once we got to landing and were
beginning to pick up some data, they became
very strong supporters. It was around that time
Carl Sagan flipped.
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MR.MORRIS:
All of them flipped, I think.
DR. MUELLER:
Yes. But by that time, we had already commit-
ted to the end of the program and there wasn't
much we could do about it. The Bureau of the
Budget had us where we couldn't do anything
at that point.
DR. GILRUTH:
We landed six times. That was enough.
DR. KRAFT:
I think that is a point that has been discussed a
little bit recently.
DR. LOGSDON:
I would like to push on that point a little bit,
that six was enough in his judgment. That per-
haps the risk-benefit calculation changed
somewhere in there, that the risk of each addi-
tional mission might have been greater than the
benefits.
DR. GILRUTH:
Well, one of the things we had to find out was
whether the Moon was different in different
places. And no matter how well you did in one
landing, you didn't know what it was like in
another place. And we went to three or four dif-
ferent places, and they really were somewhat
different, but basic things were not.
We felt that we had gotten about as nmch as we
could get, unless we found something later on.
But I think the scientists were pretty well satis-
fied, too, that we had made a good going of the
various places around the Moon and doing the
kinds of things as best they could think of what
we should do.
DR. KRAFT:
I think that has been discussed in recent weeks
relative to our process with the scientists,
which I thought George made a great point of.
And that is, on the first mission, we used a lot
of profanity if you want to know the facts of it.
We want to get the damn job done. Let us fly
one time. Let us get familiar with the operation.
Let us prove to ourselves that we know what
we are doing, how we can get there, and that
we have got a familiarity with that. After that,
we will do anything you ask us to do within the
performance of this vehicle.
And if you look at the record, that is exactly
what we did. After Apollo ll, we did not make
a single move without the scientists saying that
was what they wanted to do. All we did was
give them the performance limits, tell them
what we thought we could do, and in that enve-
lope. And from then on, they were in control,
totally in control.
MR. MORRIS:
As a matter of fact, after the first mission,
almost all of our activity was to enhance the
scientific capability of the vehicle.
DR. KRAFT:
Absolutely.
MR. MORRIS:
We brought the lunar rover on Apollo 15. We
had the extended lunar module. We were able
to stay another day. We had more cargo capa-
bility.
DR. KRAFT:
We put an automobile on the spacecraft, and
they could go 20 miles away from the landing.
MR. MORRIS:
So almost all of our activity after Apollo 11,
even before that, was to extend--
DR. KRAFT:
I think that is an extremely important point. We
didn't do anything, operationally from then on,
or we did a lot of E&D, engineering and devel-
opment work, because we had to expand the
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envelopeof themachineto makeit heavier,to
do more thingsand carrymoreweightand
bringmorebackandeverythingyoucanname
aboutit.Butit wasalldonebecauseofwanting
todomorescience.
MR. MORRIS:
That's right.
DR. MUELLER:
One point to make, and that is the Apollo, as it
was conceived and designed, had some limita-
tions on what it could do. Perhaps one of the
chief things that we failed to find in our various
explorations of the Moon was where water was
because that is, of course the key to future use
of the Moon. And that is when we simply didn't
have the envelope to simply explore where the
most likely places were for the water to be,
which is by the poles. But then we were faced
with the fact that we had an envelope that we
could carry on scientific research. And beyond
a certain point, we weren't able to do enough
more things to make it worthwhile to argue at
least that you should continue.
Now, in retrospect, the scientists said well, we
should have had another 20 missions because
we now know what we could do with that fair-
ly limited capability. But by that time, it was
past the point of no return. We also had started
on, we thought, a rather ambitious program to
build a space shuttle, a completely reusable
vehicle, and we were going to build a trans-
portation system that was going to be low cost
to a space station that was going to serve as a
way-point to lunar operations, a real lunar
operation. So we had a program in place that
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we thought was going to transform interplane-
tary space into the kind of thing where people
were going to live.
MR. TINDALL:
We had Skylab coming up, too.
DR. MUELLER:
We had Skylab.
MR. TINDALL:
We had a lot of science on that.
DR. MUELLER:
Right.
DR. LOGSDON:
It may be too early in our time to ask this ques-
tion, but it is the clear follow-up to Dr.
Mueller's observation. Why didn't Apollo pro-
vide a convincing demonstration to continue
that kind of program, that kind of develop-
ment, to build on it, to continue to use the
Saturn V systems to build a large space sta-
tion, a 33-foot station, to get on with the
Shuttle, with lunar bases? Somehow, there
was a sense that the country didn't become
convinced by what Apollo accomplished that
it was in its interest to continue. Was there
something in the program itself that led to that
outcome?
DR. MUELLER:
I would offer the observation, that it was
rather the perception of the President at the
time and his set of values that led to a decision
both to abandon the Saturn V, because we had
never really planned on abandoning the
Saturn V at the time we did since we wanted
the capability of continuing. For example, we
had two Skylabs built and planned to fly both
of them. But, the priority shifted. We had to
solve the problems of New York City and
Vietnam simultaneously, and his priority said
that that was a better way to spend the
nation's resources.
DR. KRAFT:
Well, I want to give you a humorous answer to
that. If George Mueller knew the answer to
that, and not let us know how he could have
solved the problem, and he didn't know it at the
time, I would have been pretty ticked off about
it. I don't think there is any answer to that ques-
tion. ! mean, of all people, George Mueller
would have given us an answer to it. We just
didn't have one. That is all there is to it.
DR. LOGSDON:
But I want you to reflect on the program itself.
Why did it become politically acceptable for
Richard Nixon to make that decision not to
push on with an ambitious program or the pro-
gram that had been laid out. Was there some-
thing about Apollo that did not convince the
country to go forward?
DR. GILRUTH:
Well, it was bilateral. The last landing we made
on the Moon, the networks wouldn't pay for
putting it on television. We had to pay for that
ourselves. Did you know that? We had been so
successful that people thought they knew all
about it and they did not think that they want-
ed to watch it.
DR. KRAFT:
Well, after Apollo 11, we had two men on the
Moon and one circling, and we had real time
pictures of it. And I would turn on the three
major networks at mission control, and they, all
three, had soap operas on. What can we do
about that? I don't know.
DR. LOGSDON:
Well, is there something that says that doing
space programs as TV spectaculars is not the
right way to go about it? I mean, is that the right
criteria?
DR. KRAFT:
No, look. Let me tell you. If landing men on the
Moon and bringing them back safely, and all of
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theexcitingthingsthatwedidonthelunarsur-
facedoesn'texcite the countryand doesn't
wanttogetthemmoving,I don'tknowwhatthe
hellwill. And I don'tknowwhereit is today.
Thatisjust thewaythis country is, I suppose.
We all have to recognize that.
DR. LOGSDON:
So how do you do a program that lasts for a
long time?
DR. MUELLER:
Well, let me offer an observation. The Russians
have done that. As long as we had that commit-
ment on Apollo, we were doing very well
indeed. It was when we decided that we had
finished that task, the President had decided
we had finished it, that we began to lose sup-
port of the Congress and of the President and
so that withered away. What you need is a com-
mitment, a national commitment to a continu-
ing program that doesn't depend upon a spec-
tacular success, but depends upon some results
in the economy.
DR. LOGSDON:
But let me take that one step further and ask
the people that ran Apollo. Could you capture
the spirit, the elan, the excitement of that 1961
to 1972 period, of that program, with a continu-
ing multidecade program of humans in space?
Was there something unique about the goal, the
timetable, the ability to put a flight operations
team together of young Turks that really went
to the job, that can't be reproduced in a more
normal environment? Was Apollo special in
ways that can't be reproduced?
DR. GILRUTH:
Well, we landed six times on the Moon and we
found some differences in the different places.
But it was really no point in making more land-
ings to fmd out more about the Moon. And with
that much risk, we had more spacecraft that we
could have flown. I didn't want to fly them. I
didn't want to send any more people to the
Moon because I thought we had learned the
things we were going to, and it was not worth
the risk.
DR. LOGSDON:
How about your flight teams? Were they as
good on Apollo 17? Were they better? Were they
sharper?
DR. KRAFT:
Every one got better.
MR. MORRIS:
Oh, yes.
DR. KRAFT:
They all got better. Let me try and answer your
question a little more directly. How you can
excite an organization or a nation like we did in
Apollo again is, in my mind, extremely difficult
to do. Here is a Moon that has been sitting there
as long as man has been able to look at it. We
have been writing stories about it for hundreds
of years. Not tens of years, but hundreds of
years. And then we suddenly do it.
Now, to try to come up with an event which is
going to recapture the imagination of the
United States and the world as comparable to
that I don't think is possible. Now, maybe it is.
But I don't think it would be for as long. I mean,
even if we said we were going to go to Mars, I
don't think you could keep that kind of momen-
tum going again.
So, I think George is absolutely right. We have
got to take a different tactic which says look,
space is extremely important to the economic
structure of our country. It is just as important
as defense. It is just as important as education.
It is an integral part of what we have got to do
in this country to remain preeminent, competi-
tive, technologically ahead. And that doesn't
say only the space program, but it is one of the
important elements. And the words I have used
is, it isn't some esoteric fantasy that we bunch
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of space cadets want to do. It is something that
is fundamental to the economic structure of
our countl'y.
MR. TINDALL:
Do we want to accept the assumption that the
people of the United States don't support this?
I don't think that is even true. I don't think they
have supported it a lot. The business of
whether they want to watch it on TV all the
time, you start talking about a program that
lasts 10 years. I think that if you had a trouble-
free program that was flying along marvelously
for 10 years, they would get terribly bored with
it, particularly compared to the soap operas
because, you know, really exciting stuff every-
day.
DR. LOGSDON:
Let me turn the discussion inwards. In terms of
the excellence of performance of an organiza-
tion, like NASA overall, like the Johnson Space
Center, how do you keep the quality of per-
formance that made Apollo possible, sustained
over a period of decades without that kind of
challenging goal, that short-term excitement?
DR. MUELLER:
I would argue that that really is quite possible
within an organization. And I will use an exam-
ple. Bell Laboratories had no over-reaching
goal, but it has had some very dedicated people
working in an environment, which was very
conducive to forward-looking work. The NACA
didn't have an over-reaching goal, but it had
some very dedicated people who worked con-
tinually and did some really astonishing things.
Our problem in the space arena has been that
we have first fluctuated our resources that we
have applied, and we have failed to provide a
vision of what it is we were trying to accom-
plish in any fashion, really. And that lack of a
feeling of where you are going and the inability
to hire at the right level the right set of people
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onacontinuingbasishasbeenaproblem.ButI
don'tthink there is any difticulty in keeping an
organization motivated if it has a place to go
with the things it is going to accomplish.
The public perception of that can be quite dif-
ferent. And keeping Congress motivated is a
better question, or how you keep the OMB
motivated. That is where the real question
lies.
DR. LOGSDON:
Anybody eise want to comment on that issue?
DR. FAGET:
Well, I certainly agree with George. My memo-
ries of the NACA_ there were very few people
that weren't very motivated, that didn't do a
great job. The NACA shunned publicity, literal-
ly shunned publicity. And 95 percent of their
programs were in a classified nature; they
couldn't talk about them anyway. But even their
unclassified programs, they didn't go out of
their way to brag about what they were doing.
People knew they were doing good work and
they were motivated.
DR. KRAFT:
I will give you a different answer. I would like
to take the six people sitting here, I would like
for you to give me maybe a couple hundred
more, I would like you to give me a budget, and
I would like you to send me off to do it again.
DR. LOGSDON:
And you think you are ready?
DR. KRAFT:
But I think, I am being somewhat cynical, but I
think that it would take something like that to
get it started again. I think that this agency has
become so bureaucratic in the last 10 years,
and particularly accelerated since the
Challenger accident, that trying to reinitiate
this organization into something is going to be
very difficult to do. It "ain't" going to be easy.
I often made speeches around this center here
and said look, I don't know what it is, I don't
know what the glue is that makes this organi-
zation as great as it is. But let me tell you some-
thing, if we ever lose it, I won't know how to
put it back together again. And I am frightened
to death of that. And so I think we are rapidly
approaching that in NASA, and I am frightened
to death of it.
DR. LOGSDON:
I would like to hear the rest of you react to that.
What is it about the organization today? We are
sitting here July 21, 1989. Yesterday, President
Bush said we are going back to the Moon, we
are going on to Mars. He didn't put a timetable
on it. What ff he had done that? What if he chal-
lenged the agency in 1989 to do another major
human program beyond Earth orbit?
DR. KRAFT:
If he had written a check, I would have volun-
teered.
DR. LOGSDON:
So it all comes down to money?
DR. KRAFT:
But he hasn't written a check.
MR. MORRIS:
It is more than money. It is motivation. The
check is a form of commitment, that I really
want that job done. If you have that kind of
commitment from the leadership, I don't think
there is any doubt that you can get enough
good people to go make the thing happen again.
As a matter of fact, we are kind of talking as if
the situation deteriorated so that there are not
good people doing good things. I don't think
that is true. The people I go talk to here at the
center and at Headquarters and at the Cape and
other places, I find guys working just as hard
now as we did back in the 60s and early 70s. I
really do.
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DR.LOGSDON:
What's the difference, then, Owen?
MR. MORRIS:
The difference is the commitment from above,
to some extent. I don't think we have had the
leadership within the Agency and the relation-
ship between the Agency and the administra-
tion for the last 20 years that we had in the first
10--
MR. TINDALL:
It is not just dollars.
MR. MORRIS:
--I think that is a big part of it.
MR. TINDALL:
It is not just dollars. Everyone knows that it is
hav_ng a schedule, a certain deadline that you
have to meet.
MR. MORRIS:
Right. Exactly.
MR. TINDALL:
If you are going to launch on a certain date, that
gets everybody's attention. And everyone knows
that they have got their job to get done by then
or else they are the ones that are holding it up.
DR. GILRUTH:
God forbid, that schedule pressure.
MR. TINDALL:
It is schedule pressure. You've got to under-
stand, where I am working now, there isn't any
schedule pressure at all. Some projects are
going along, and I am just astounded, all of a
sudden a project manager will have a schedule
slip of a year and not care. I am not kidding you.
DR. KRAFT:
I will go even further than that. I have spoken
to one of the major program managers in the
last few days and said we need to get on with
the space station. And his answer was well, you
may want it in a hurry, but what is the hurry.
MR. TINDALL:
Yes.
DR. KRAFT:
What difference does it make whether we get
the space station in two or three years. And
frankly, I think that is an attitude that does
exist. And if you have got that attitude, you ain't
going to get it done.
MR. TINDALL:
Because all of the other organizations have to
know that there is a certain launch date, and
whatever it is going to be they are going to be
held accountable if they are not ready. Really
puts a lot of motivation.
DR. LOGSDON:
How do you do this decades-long thing?
DR. KRAFT:
I don't know. Maybe there is some serum you
give somebody. I don't know, but I said that is a
very tenuous thing. There isn't any formula that
you can write down to make that happen.
DR. MUELLER:
It's called leadership. And fundamentally,
unless you have got the right set of leaders in,
you can't cause it to happen. If you have got the
wrong set in, it won't ever happen.
DR. GILRUTH:
Yes, but you have to have some real knowledge
that you can get the funds and you can do it ff
you put together a good enough group.
Otherwise, you are like we are now. We can't
put a good bunch together because we don't
know where we would get the money.
DR. LOGSDON:
Let me go around, maybe start with Chris, and
go around, the main audience for this videotape
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®is the young engineers of the '90s and beyond.
What would you tell them the lesson of Apollo
for them is?
DR. KRAFT:
Well, unfortunately, there are a lot of them. But
you start with the fact that the legacy of Apollo
is you can do anything you set your mind to do
in this country. And as evidenced by Apollo, it
didn't even help to be very reasonable because
there weren't very many of us who thought
Apollo was reasonable the day that Mr. Kennedy
said we were going to do it. We didn't even have
a man in orbit yet.
The second thing is, that I think that you can't
be afraid of hard work. Because God knows
that there is not anybody that worked at the
Johnson Space Center, in the '60s particularly,
that didn't have 10 jobs to do and they had to
have them done tomorrow, and they spent all of
their waking hours doing it. Even when they
were at home having dinner at night they were
thinking about getting their job done, and
enjoyed every danm minute of it. And I would
like to be faced with that problem again.
DR. LOGSDON:
Bob.
DR. GILRUTH:
I think it has been said pretty well, and I don't
have anything to add right now.
DR. LOGSDON:
M_.
DR. FAGET"
Well, of course Apollo was really a unique situ-
ation, and there is no way that we can recreate
that. But, basically, I really think that a lot could
be done towards getting the engineers in NASA,
giving them the opportunity to do more on their
own behalf. I know that going back to the good
old days, to the NACA, is a song that everybody
is tired of hearing, but back in those days, it
didn't make any difference how junior an engi-
neer you were. If you showed any spark of
capability, you could bet that your supervisor
would give you a project that would be your
own, your own responsibility. And you would
be entirely graded by what you did based on
your own thinking out of the problem and
accomplishing it. And that is what you need.
HowardW. Tindall,Jr,
secondfromright, and,
left to right, Bifl Schneider,
ChrisKraft,andSig Sjoberg
monitora problemwiththe
CommandServiceModule
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Youneedan organizationwith a culturein
whichanindividualcantakeonajobandgetit
doneif givenachance.AndIamafraidthathas
to beinstilledandI agreewithChris,youneed
leadershipto dothat.Theleaderhasgottoreal-
ly believein hisorganization,andbelievethat
theycandothings,andfredwaysto challenge
them.
DR. LOGSDON:
Owen.
MR. MORRIS:
I think one of the big things that I saw in all of
the people working on Apollo was a sense of
pride in doing something right. A sense of being
willing to take a challenge, find out how to go
about it, and then go solve it, make the event
happen whatever it was, and then the sense of
pride that comes from that. And there is will-
ingness there to go beyond what you are asked
to do, to go get your hands dirty, to go under-
stand how the hardware is really going to work,
to understand how the software is really going
to interface, whatever the job is. And I think
that willingness to go the extra mile, to get the
feeling of satisfaction you get when you do the
job right is something that is really important
then.
DR. LOGSDON:
George?
DR. MUELLER:
Well, I had a somewhat different career, in a
sense, because nay first 20 years as an engineer
and physicist were involved in avoiding man-
agement. So, I spent a lot of time working hard
on benches and things like that and teaching,
and trying to keep from becoming a manager.
And I think that is something I would like to
pass on to the young people coming in the
years ahead, and that is, until you really under-
stand and have built within yourself the techni-
cal capability of knowing something very well
and in-depth, you really ought not to try to man-
age a program. And so often we think that man-
agement is the end point. It really is just one of
those things that you have to do as career
develops, but it isn't the "funness" part at all.
The fun part is when you are doing something.
And that is what we fail to really emphasize in
today's world.
MR. MORRIS:
Amen.
DR. LOGSDON:
Bill.
MR. TINDALL:
Well, I don't have that much to add. I think both
the thing that Chris said and that George said is
exactly right. I remember through my career, I
never worried about the next, or any promo-
tions at all. In fact, I was just having a really
good time, really, really good time. And I guess
the organization we were in encouraged that.
That is what both of them were saying. You did-
n't really, you weren't concerned about whether
you were going to become a program manager
and quit lifting those 50 pound weights up and
down hundreds of times a day like I used to do.
DR. KRAFT:
Or have hydraulic oil spilled all over you.
MR. TINDALL:
That's exactly right. We don't want to get in
there. But the thing that was so outstanding,
you just hope that the young engineers and sci-
entists that we are talking to here have a
chance to be, to get into an organization, I don't
know whether it has to be a project like Apollo,
but an organization like we had that really del-
egated the jobs as tough or tougher than you
could do and just said go on out there and fig-
ure out how you can do it because it was so
doggone much fun.
I mean, when Chris was talking, when he start-
ed out talking about these terrible 14 and 16
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Apollo wasreallya uniquesituation,
andthereis no waythat wecanrecreate
hour days and all during dinner that you were
working, but I would just change the word from
work to play because I never thought we were
working at all. And that is the honest to God
truth. It was just so much fun. In fact, I think it
would be terrible if you had to go through life
working. Really.
DR. MUELLER:
I agree. I would like to add one thing for our
future managers. Just because you become a
manager doesn't mean you no longer can do
anything technical. Some managers think that
you are a manager, and therefore you can't do
anything useful anymore.
I remember sometime, about 1968 I guess it
was, that Sam Phillips asked me to take off my
hat of manager and start looking at software
and try to do an in-depth review of our software
system. It happens that I have some back-
ground in software systems. So I did do that. So
that was quite a separate thing from being man-
ager of a manned spaceflight program. It was a
technical challenge, and we did a fairly in-depth
review and I think we had some positive impact
as a result of that in terms of being sure that the
software wasn't going to destroy us half way
where ever we were.
DR. LOGSDON:
Apollo, 20 years ago yesterday, for the first time
landed humans on the Moon. It is clearly a
piece of history, a grand human adventure, but
it was also a remarkable engineering, technical,
management operation achievement. The six
gentlemen that have been sharing their
thoughts with you this afternoon are the peo-
ple, and represent many more people, that
made that happen. And we may not see the
likes of Apollo again, but the future will hold
great promise as well.
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